Victor
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pages 45-49
Next day the entire state militia was called out under orders to go with all possible dispatch to the Cripple Creek District and preserve the peace.6 More specific directions were given to General Brooks, in command, by the governor. He was to place his force between the miners and deputies, and prevent a clash between them by every possible means. The disbandment of the deputy army was to be secured at the earliest possible moment. Protection was to be afforded to the sheriff and to the mine owners, but armed bodies of deputies were to be prevented from making arrests, or from occupying the mines.7
MILITARY PRISONERS UNDER HEAVY GUARD
At Colorado Springs and Cripple Creek it was felt that the trouble was over, and there was great rejoicing. The mine owners were rapidly signifying their intention of accepting the agreement, and the miners had sent out word that they would stand by the governor's action, and that they would not resist the militia. But the deputies had yet to be reckoned with. On the night of the 6th they broke camp, and cutting all telegraph and telephone lines, and imprisoning all newspaper reporters, they advanced toward Bull Hill. Morning found them camped in Beaver Park, about three miles from Altman, and in full view of the miners' camp. A small skirmish took place just after day-break. Some of the deputies' horses strayed beyond the picket line, and a squad was sent out to bring them in. The men ran into the picket line of the miners and a lively exchange of shots took place, in which no one was injured.
The militia arrived early in the afternoon, and following their orders, went into camp between the deputies and miners. Later in the afternoon Generals Brooks and Tarsney held a conference with the leaders of the deputies, in which a great deal of friction was created by the question whether the militia or the county officials were higher in authority. Both sides claimed the right to command and be assisted, and there was cause for much anxiety as to what would happen on the morrow.
Early next morning the deputy camp was in motion. The men were formed into line, divided into several detachments, and started off in as many directions. General Brooks kept watch of the movement, and when it became evident from their line of march that the detachments were all headed for Bull Hill, he sent for Sheriff Bowers, inquiring what he intended to do.
From the miners' camp on the hill the movements were being watched closely. As the long lines of men swung out in the valley below and took up their march forward, the alarm whistle at the Victor mine gave forth its warning blasts, and in a few moments the hillsides were dotted with men hurrying in to headquarters. Fifteen minutes saw the ranks complete, and "General" Johnson issuing orders that were to give the deputies a warm reception.
The miners had no cannon, as has been generally supposed, but they had a weapon even more deadly at close range in the shape of a huge bow-gun. This weapon was a home-made affair, and could throw to the foot of the hill. Its missiles were beer bottles filled with dynamite. It would work terrible execution when the deputies attempted the steep climb for the summit. Different points on the hill were mined, and connected with electric wires to explode at the pressing of a button. Every man was well armed, and with a belt or pocket full of cartridges. In the upper left vest pocket of each were five dynamite cartridges the size of pencils. These were fitted with percussion caps and were to be thrown at close quarters as the deputies came up the steep incline. Every advantage was taken of the natural strength of the place in distributing the men. Altogether Bull Hill was an extremely hazardous place to attack.
In the valley below General Brooks had not waited for an answer from his message to the sheriff. The buglers called the troops to arms, and having formed quickly they went off at double quick after the ranks of the deputies. General Brooks rode rapidly on ahead. Coming up with the sheriff a quick dispute ensued. The general inquired what was the meaning of this movement. Sheriff Bowers replied that he was sending squads of men to guard the roads leading from Bull Hill to prevent the escape of men for whom he had warrants, and that he was going on the hill with another squad to make arrests.8 General Brooks replied that he was under orders to prevent armed bodies of deputies from attempting to make arrests, and that they must return to their camp. The sheriff insisted that he should proceed. General Brooks asserted that he must carry out his orders, and would be compelled to fire upon the deputies unless they ceased their march immediately. Sheriff Bowers held a conference with some of his men, and seeing that the general was determined, gave orders for the deputies to return to their camp.
The militia continued on their march, and entered Altman shortly after noon. Upon seeing the deputies turn back, the miners had dispersed again, and following their repeated statements to that effect received the militia without any show of resistance. That night the militia occupied the miners' camp.
Governor "Waite had all along maintained that the deputy army was illegally assembled, and General Brooks had been ordered to secure its disbandment. Even with Bull Hill in the hands of the militia, and the miners' army dispersed, the deputies refused to disband. Under the leadership of Deputy Bob Mullins they marched next morning to Cripple Creek, and passing through the city arrested everybody who in any way met with their disapproval. Then they took up the line of march to the Independence mine, and went into camp around it. General Brooks met the deputies on the way to the Independence, and again demanded that they disperse, but was met with a blunt refusal.
General Brooks had been in constant communication with the governor all day. In the morning he telegraphed that the sheriff had reported the deputies to be beyond his control. Later in the day he sent the following telegram: "Situation critical. Sheriff persists in quartering his entire force at Independence mine. Says he does so at request of owner. There is in my judgment but one solution martial law. General Tarsney indorses this opinion. (Signed) Brooks." To this the governor replied that his orders must be carried out at all hazards. "If the deputies resist your authority I will call out the unorganized militia to suppress their insurrection."9 That meant that every able-bodied man between eighteen and forty-five might be called out, and that the controversy would assume proportions which would make the miners' affair seem small indeed.10
Fortunately, before any further action had been taken, a conference was held at Altman between mine owners, militia officers, and county officials. There were present Sheriff Bowers and County Commissioner Boynton, W. S. Stratton and Chas. Steele of the Independence, Mr. Keith of the Victor, Wm. Lennox, L. P. Airhart, Generals Brooks and Tarsney, and Colonel Hagel. The following agreement was reached.11
1. Deputies to be withdrawn.
2. The mines to be put in peaceable possession of the owners.
3. Military protection to be afforded to mines and miners.
4. Troops to remain for 30 days at least, and longer if necessary in the opinion of the commanding general.
5. Miners to deliver up all arms in their possession, also personal property belonging to other persons or taken from the mines.
6. Troops to be stationed at Cripple Creek, Victor, and Anaconda.
7. Persons for whom the sheriff has or may have warrants to be arrested and turned over to the sheriff at Colorado Springs.
This agreement was carried out and was the final settlement of the difficulty.
"Davis H. Walte,
"Governor of Colorado."
7Biennial Report of Adjutant General, p. 48.
8The Adjiitatnt General's Biennial Jfcport says that Sheriff Bowers pleaded that he could not control the men.
9Colorado State Papers. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General, 1893 and 1894, p. 50. Also cf. Office of Adjutant General, impression copies order to militia, May, 1894.
10The telegrams of the 8th and 9th are here given in full. Davis H. Waite, Governor.
The deputies moved from the right and left of our position this morning, contrary to agreement not to do so, and advanced on the miners. It becoming evident to General Brooks that they intended an attack upon the miners, the entire column was put in motion, and the bodies of deputies overtaken at a point 1 mile from Altman. Under orders of General Brooks they returned to their camp.
I most respectfully urge, in view of our close proximity to the miners, that we be Instructed to receive their surrender, which I am credibly informed that all are anxious to make. They sent a committee to confer with me last night, but the committee were arrested by the deputies and I did not meet them.
Answer. T. J. Tarsney,
Adjutant General.
Adjutant General, T. J. Tarsney.
Accept surrender of miners. Do not disarm them, but protect them with all your power. Make a cordon and keep armed deputies out. Advise sheriff and make no arrests. Use no force to compel any arrested man to go with the sheriff. Let that be voluntary. If the armed deputies resist your authority I will call out the unorganized militia to suppress their insurrection.
Davis H. Waite,
Governor.
Davis H. Waite, Governor.
Deputies were sent out in squads this morning to arrest parties for whom I have warrants and who are trying to leave the district. While these deputies were in the discharge of their duties they were intercepted by General Brooks, with the State Militia, and ordered to return to camp. I understand the militia are here to aid me in serving process and placing the mine owners in possession of their property. If this is not the case and they are sent here to prevent me from doing my duty and hindering the law, then I most respectfully request their immediate recall. M. F. Bowers,
Sheriff.
M. F. Bowers, Sheriff.
It is ill advised to send out squads to arrest miners at this time. General Brooks is in the field to compel peace. He Is ordered to prevent any arrests or attacks by armed deputies. The militia are under the orders of the commander in chief, and not of the sheriff. If the deputies resist the order of General Brooks to suppress insurrection they resist the lawful power "of the state.